M10 Booker: A Guide to Irrational Aquisition
The M10 Booker embodies fundamental failures of with Department of Defense acquisition, including the lack of critical analysis and when to stop wasting the taxpayer’s money.
Start with what the Army first envisioned in 2013: A light tank to replace the retired M551 Sheridan that could support infantry with two of them airdropping from a C-130 or C-17 cargo aircraft. An April 27, 2025, Defense One article showed how the program spiraled out of control.
It quickly became clear that the envisioned vehicle would not fit inside a C-130. Rather than fixing that problem, the Army Requirements Oversight Council ruled in 2015 that the M10 Booker would neither be required to fit inside a C-130 nor airdropped at all. Then altered Air Force load restrictions meant that only one M10 could fit in a C-17, instead of the planned two. At 42 tons, the M10 weighs much less than the 70-ton M1 Abrams (the Army’s main battle tank) but far exceeds the 16-ton M551 Sheridan.
Indeed, the M10’s weight has proven problematic in more than one way. In 2018, the M10 was assigned to a variety of bases including Fort Campbell, which sits astride the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Unfortunately (and unbelievably), the M10 is too heavy to drive across eight of the 11 bridges at the base.
According to Senior Advisor for Science and Technology and the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Alexander Miller, the M10 should have been cancelled as soon it became clear it would never be easily airdropped. Miller said, “As soon as you remove the requirement for airdropability, you’re no longer actually helping infantry. You are just as maneuverable as a main battle tank at that point, which means you are less maneuverable.”
The M10 is not only too heavy to be useful for the Army but also replete with obsolete technology. The M10 was obliged to use the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCARS), which was first incorporated by the Army in 1990. To replace SINCARS, the Army spent $15 billion over 15 years on the Joint Tactical Radio System, only to cancel the program.
CTO Miller neatly summarized the M10 Booker mess in the Defense One article, stating, “So now you have a vehicle that is the best idea of 2013, that has the best technology limitations of 2013 – which are really technology limitations of 2000, because you’re trying to be backwards-compatible…You’ve added boundary conditions that say you can’t expand. You can’t expand the capabilities because you can’t add autonomy. You can’t actually add digital technologies. And the process continues to move.”
In the meantime, the Army is heavily investing in an upgraded version of the M1 Abrams, and has emphasized a much faster timeline. Its experience with the M10 Booker should provide a useful guide in what not to do in the future.
