Joint Strike Fighter: Platform for Waste?

Designed for service by the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and eight international partners, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is expected to produce an aircraft with a few variations that will ultimately replace the in-service F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft.  However, the program has long come under fire as being over-priced and behind schedule.

The JSF program originated in 1996, with a five-year competition between aerospace giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin.  In 2001, Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract, having proven its design to be superior as well as more cost-effective.  In the past eight years, the JSF program has become the largest acquisition program within the Department of Defense (DOD), with a total cost estimate of $300 billion.  It has also become the lengthiest acquisition program; it is anticipated to last through 2034.

Within this timeframe, the JSF has seen cost overruns of $55 billion, and delivery dates for “initial operational capability” pushed back from 2010-2012 to 2012-2015.  The number of aircraft expected to be ordered by the Pentagon has dropped from 2,866, to 2,456, according to a December, 2007 DOD estimate.

A March, 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that JSF development “will cost more and take longer than reported to the Congress last year, and DOD wants to accelerate procurement believing that will more quickly recapitalize tactical air forces.  The program office estimates that an additional $2.4 billion is needed for cost overruns on the air system and engine contracts and for a 1-year extension to the development schedule.”

However, as GAO pointed out, this estimate does not include the cost of an alternative engine that was never envisioned by the Pentagon but nevertheless is being funded by Congress through earmarks, including $465 million in fiscal year 2009 alone, in order to supposedly increase competition and flexibility for pilots.  With the cost of funding for an alternative engine included, GAO reported, “an independent joint DOD cost estimating team identified a need for as much as $7.4 billion in additional funding for development through fiscal year 2015 and a 3-year schedule extension.  This would increase total system development costs to $51.8 billion – a 17 percent increase from the April 2008 estimate – and delay completion of development to October 2016.”  CBS News reported on July 30, 2007 that the Air Force and two independent panels concluded that the second engine is “not necessary and not affordable” and that the professed savings from competition “will never be achieved.” 

With President Obama’s threats to crack down on big ticket items in the DOD budget, now is the time to shut off the second engine and get other JSF costs under control.