Pentagon Fails to Learn from Shipbuilding Misadventures

Longtime readers of the WasteWatcher will be familiar with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a poorly designed vessel that has long dogged Pentagon planners while burning taxpayer cash.  Unfortunately, two recent examples have demonstrated that the Department of Defense (DOD) has learned nothing from that boondoggle and continues to struggle to build new ships on time and under budget.

The Navy, which was responsible for the “Little Crappy Ship,” as the LCS has been called, has another failed ship procurement on its hands.  On November 25, 2025, Navy Secretary John Phelan announced that his service would finish work on the two Constellation-class frigates currently under construction, but would cancel the subsequent four other vessels.

The Navy had initially planned to spend $22 billion on up to 20 frigates over multiple decades.  To reduce risks and move faster, the Navy chose a design and technologies that were proven on other vessels.  However, a May 29, 2024, Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that, “…the Navy undercut this approach by starting construction on the first frigate before finishing its design, among other missteps.  Due to ongoing major design challenges, construction on the first ship is at a standstill.”  As a result, the first ship is more than three years behind schedule.

A second GAO analysis of the frigates detailed how incorrect assumptions about the frigate’s design and subsequent changes undercut the program’s viability.  According to a March 25, 2025, GAO report, in August 2022, the Navy “certified to Congress that the basic and functional designs were 88 percent complete,” and approved construction of the first vessel.  But the GAO found that, “the Navy used metrics for measuring design progress that obscured its visibility into the actual basic and functional design progress.  As a result, the Navy substantially overstated design progress when it approved construction to begin.”  In the end, more than two years after reporting that the frigate’s basic and functional designs were 88 percent complete, in December 2024, the Navy reported that the correct figure was just 70 percent.

While the Navy has the largest and most expensive boats, the Coast Guard has the most vessels and has consequently experienced its fair share of shipbuilding setbacks.  In 2014, the Coast Guard awarded three contracts to begin building 25 Heritage-class Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC).  A November 25, 2025, GAO report detailed how the building of the vessels, “began without a stable design, contrary to shipbuilding leading practices.  This led to rework, which delayed ship deliveries.”  As a result, the projected costs for building the ships increased by 57 percent, from $12.5 billion in 2012 to $19.6 billion in 2023.  The latest cost estimate is currently being tabulated by the Coast Guard, but according to the GAO, “…the OPC design remains incomplete, ships have yet to be delivered, and the risk of continued delays and cost overruns is likely.”  The first ship is not expected to be ready until at least December 2026, more than five years behind schedule.

These twin failures feature a shared problem:  The Pentagon continues to approve ship construction before stable, mature designs are completed, violating best practices in maritime procurement and virtually guaranteeing cost and schedule blowouts.  To fix its shipbuilding dilemma, the DOD must follow best contracting practices and avoid making the same costly mistakes.  The delays and higher costs not only impact taxpayers but also readiness and the incorporation of updated technology to meet global challenges from other countries that do not have the same issues with procurement.