Joint Strike Fighter Limited by Inadequate Software
The WasteWatcher
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has been hailed as the cornerstone of U.S. military aviation for decades, but its software development issues continue to undermine its full potential. A January 31, 2025, Department of Defense Operation Test and Evaluation (OTE) report highlighted persistent struggles within the program, including “no improvement in meeting schedule and performance timelines for developing and testing software designed to address deficiencies and add new capabilities.”
Lockheed Martin, the JSF’s prime contractor, is struggling to deliver aircraft with improvements to displays, computers, and processing power known as Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3), which was meant to be ready in April 2023, and is set to run $1 billion over budget. The Pentagon began to refuse acceptance of new JSFs in July 2023 because of shortcomings in TR-3. After the contractor released a “truncated” version of TR-3, which enabled the aircraft’s use in training, but not combat, the government accepted deliveries again beginning in July 2024. However, the Pentagon is withholding payment of approximately $5 million for each aircraft until TR-3 is completed. The OTE stated that, because the JSF program office “has not adequately planned” for testing, “dedicated operational testing of these aircraft will not occur until mid to late FY26, approximately two years after the configuration began delivery to the field.”
In the meantime, the contactor is also failing to fix the aircraft’s current software. According to the OTE report, the JSF program “cannot simultaneously work out solutions” to TR-2 while developing TR-3.
This ongoing software saga underscores the larger problem of inefficiencies and mismanagement within defense procurement as Citizens Against Government Waste described in its “Critical Waste Issues for the 119th Congress.” The JSF’s troubles are emblematic of a broader trend in which government-funded software development is too frequently burdened by inefficiencies and cost overruns. With a price tag exceeding $1.7 trillion, the F-35 should be a model of cutting-edge technology and operational readiness. Instead, it has become a symbol of the Pentagon’s failure to manage complex projects efficiently.
The JSF’s software development woes are not only a technical issue, but also emblematic of systemic problems in the defense industry. If the Pentagon is serious about maintaining America’s technological edge and ensuring the effectiveness of its military assets, it must confront and resolve these challenges with greater accountability.