JSF Alternate Engine and Congress in an Alternate Universe
September 30, 2009
by: David Williams

Government WasteWatch, Fall 2009

The Pentagon and the White House are engaged in a tug-of-war with Congress as to whether or not to fund an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).  The battle is not about military capability, it is about whether the Pentagon or Congress should decide which weapons systems should be developed and deployed.

The JSF began development in 1996.  The idea was to create an affordable fighter to replace the current fighters which are starting to show their age both in terms of wear and tear and competitive performance.  The JSF program created a technologically advanced jet which the military predicts will be without rival until 2040.

In 2001, Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract, having proven its design to be superior as well as more cost-effective.  The winning bid included the F135 engine developed by Pratt & Whitney.  The engine is a high performance turbofan jet engine.  By all accounts, the engine is easy to maintain, highly sustainable, extremely powerful, and available at comparatively low costs.  In 1998, two years after the JSF project began, Congress mandated that an alternate engine, the F136 built by General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce, be created to compete with the F135.

What started out as a reasonable idea to fund an alternate engine in 1998 is no longer needed.  In fact, the Pentagon and Presidents Bush and Obama have been trying to eliminate funding for the alternate engine since 2006.  There have been no conclusive studies to say that an alternate engine will either save the Pentagon money or enhance the capabilities of the JSF.  In fact, a March 2007 Government Accountability Office report noted that funding the alternate engine could cost at least $7.2 billion.  And, General Mark Shackelford testified on June 9 before the Senate Airland Subcommittee that funding the alternate engine could mean eliminating as many as 53 JSF aircraft in order to offset costs. 

According to Retired Air Force General John Michael Loh, “The current engine in the F-35 is in production and exceeding expectations.  It has a strong pedigree as a variant of the F-22 engine.  That engine, the Pratt & Whitney F119, has been one of the most successful engine development and production programs in history.  It is three times safer and more reliable than its predecessor, the F100 engine.  There is no reason to expect a catastrophic failure that would necessitate an alternate engine.”

Despite the exorbitant cost, Pentagon opposition and logic, Congress has appropriated $770 million in earmarks from fiscal years 2004-2009, including three anonymous earmarks totaling $465 million in the fiscal year 2009 Defense Appropriations Act for the alternate engine. 

Most recently, the House of Representatives earmarked $603 million in the fiscal year 2010 Defense Authorization Act and $560 million anonymously in the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act in direct defiance of President Obama’s threatened veto of such funding. 

Even though the Senate initially included $439 million in it’s version of the Defense Authorization Bill, the money was stripped out.

In May, President Obama highlighted the alternate engine as an example of government waste.  The President stated, “We’re going to save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe — but rather prevent us from spending money on what does keep us safe.  One example is a $465 million program to build an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter.  The Defense Department is already pleased with the engine that it has. They do not want — and do not plan to use — the alternate version. That’s why the Pentagon stopped requesting this funding two years ago.”

Funding for the alternate engine only survives because of congressional intervention and pork-barrel politics.  Congress needs to respect the Pentagon and stop funding the alternate engine.