June 20, 2010
by: Sean Kennedy

Government WasteWatch, Spring 2010

In an effort to convince skeptics in Congress, at the Pentagon and in the White House that there should be an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), GE and Rolls-Royce submitted on April 27, 2010 a fixed-price offer for its F136 engine. The companies are offering a fixed price for early-production engines purchased in 2012, and a reduced price for engines in 2013 and 2014. The estimates for these years were not disclosed. However, as is usually the case, this proposed cost reduction is not what it seems.

One caveat is obvious, albeit underreported in the news: prior to reaching the point where they are able to sell the Department of Defense (DOD) engines for the JSF, GE and Rolls-Royce claim they will require $1.8 billion to develop the F136 and begin early production. This money would need to be directed from Congress as an earmark ($1.2 billion has already been earmarked for the program since 2004), as the DOD again refused to fund the alternate engine in its fiscal year 2011 budget.

Unfortunately for taxpayers, this $1.8 billion estimate is probably low. According to an April 27, 2010 article in The Hill, “In February, a Pentagon analysis, performed by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE), found that the government would have to spend $2.9 billion over the next six years for the development of the engine, infrastructure and spare parts.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has repeatedly asserted his opposition to the alternate engine, and recommended that President Obama veto any legislation that contains funding for the F136. In a press conference on May 20, 2010, Gates commented on the fixed-price offer, stating, “The proposal does provide a fixed price, but not for the engine we need. The proposed engine is based on the design they currently have on the test stand, which we are deeply concerned may not meet the performance needs of the Joint Strike Fighter.”

The timing of the fixed-price proposal is linked to the House version of the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, which includes $485 million for the F136. An amendment offered by Rep. Chellie Pingree (D-Maine) to strip this amount failed in the House on May 27, 2010 by a vote of 231-193. The Senate refused to fund the alternate engine in its version of the bill, but as usual, funding for the F136 will ultimately be decided in conference.

The alternate engine has faced its share of problems in the past year. In October, 2009, a nut came loose during testing of the F136, causing damage to turbine blades. Then, in November, 2009, GE/Rolls-Royce announced that deliveries of the alternate engine will be delayed one year. On May 4, 2010, DefenseNews.com reported that Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ashton Carter told an audience at the Sea-Air-Space symposium, “There is not a good analytical case that the upfront costs of the second engine would be paid back,” and asserted the key to success for the JSF program “must be affordability.”

His comments were just the latest in a long line of strong support for the elimination of the alternate engine from President Obama, former President Bush, the Pentagon, the Office of Management and Budget, and independent analysts. The project is expensive, unnecessary, and only survives because of pork-barrel politics.