Testimony to the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency Organization
September 27, 2005
by: Tom Schatz

Testimony

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the more than one million members and supporters of Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW).  We hope that this hearing will begin the process of approval for two important commissions that will act to reign in long-standing government inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and waste. 

CAGW was created 21 years ago after J. Peter Grace presented to President Ronald Reagan the 2,478 findings and recommendations of the Grace Commission (formally known as the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control).  These recommendations provided a blueprint for a more efficient, effective, and smaller government.

Since 1984, the implementation of Grace Commission and other waste-cutting recommendations has helped save taxpayers more than $825 billion.  CAGW is the nation's largest nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to eliminating waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in government.

CAGW is classified as a Section 501(c)(3) organization under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.  The organization has not received any federal money and does not plan to receive any federal funds in the future.

Mr. Chairman, as we are all well aware, the nation has seen an alarming spending growth rate over the last 11 years.  Total outlays are more than 60 percent higher in 2005 than in 1994.  Without much-needed restraint, the spending spree will only continue as several financially daunting issues loom, including Social Security, Medicare, disaster relief, and military conflicts. 

Despite these liabilities, Congress is still passing legislation loaded with pork.  The 2005 highway transportation bill is a prime example:  it contained more than 6,300 earmarks totaling more than $24 billion over the next five years.  The fiscal year 2005 appropriations bills included a record 13,997 projects costing an unprecedented $27.3 billion.  CAGW has already identified more than $16 billion in pork in the fiscal 2006 appropriations bills.

In a time when members of Congress should be searching for offsets for major federal obligations, they are not taking the necessary steps to get spending under control.

There are many programs that lack oversight or coordination, have outlived their effectiveness, duplicate other programs, or are simply pet projects that never served any meaningful purpose.  These programs are funded even though they are ineffective and wasteful.  They remain in existence in part because members of Congress have many short-term interests, while important long-term decisions are bogged down or ignored.  However, there is an opportunity to change this with the proposed bills:  H.R. 3276, the Government Reorganization and Improvement of Performance Act; and H.R. 3277, the Federal Agency Performance Review and Sunset Act.

The Results Commissions would form at the request of the President to investigate a specific program or programs that the President may feel is redundant, ineffective, or inefficient.  Seven members would be selected by the President after consultation with congressional leaders.  The Commission would then compile and analyze information concerning that program or programs and conclude by sending recommendations to the President.  If the President disapproves the recommendations, the Commission would have the opportunity to respond by changing or not changing its recommendations.  The Commission’s recommendations would then be sent to Congress for expedited consideration.  The process is similar to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC.

This type of commission was established in South Carolina in 2002.  Governor Mark Sanford (R) created the Governor’s Commission on Management, Accountability and Performance.  That commission enlisted 12 bipartisan business leaders and more than 300 private volunteers to identify ineffective, inefficient, or redundant programs that could have saved South Carolina $255 million initially and $300 million every year thereafter.

The manner in which members are appointed and recommendations are made by a Sunset Commission would be nearly identical to the Results Commissions.  The major difference is executive branch programs would be set to terminate at least once every 10 years and face mandatory review before that time, on a schedule determined by the President.  The Commission would pass its recommendations on to the President who would submit legislation to Congress. 

Sunset Commissions have been used by many states.  States that currently use some form of a Sunset Commission include:  Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  In Texas, strong legislative support has meant 90 percent of the Sunset Commission’s recommendations have been passed into law. 

The concept of identifying effective and ineffective programs already exists at the federal level.  The Performance and Assessment Ratings Tool (PART), according to the Office of Management and Budget, “was developed to assess the effectiveness of federal programs and help inform management actions, budget requests, and legislative proposals directed at achieving results.  The PART examines various factors that contribute to the effectiveness of a program and requires that conclusions be explained and substantiated with evidence.  The PART assesses if and how program evaluation is used to inform program planning and to corroborate program results.” 

Despite some successes like the elimination of the TRIO Upward Bound Program in H.R. 3010, which passed the House on June 24, 2005, Congress has largely ignored programs identified by PART as “ineffective.”  Nonetheless, PART has shown results with the reforms of some programs without action by Congress.  Both the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Administration on Aging have increased their efficiency and effectiveness after PART identified areas they could improve.

CAGW does not believe symbolic commissions will suffice.  Any entity created must have real teeth and autonomy.  Two examples of effective commissions are the Grace Commission and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

During the 1980s, no major military bases were closed due to Congress’s strict rules governing the procedure for closures.  These procedures came about after the Department of Defense in the 1960s had the authority to close bases without the consent of Congress.  When Congress became more involved in the process, political pressures and skirmishes inhibited to the progress of shutting down or realigning inefficient bases. 

In 1988 the barrier was broken and Congress established the first BRAC.  The bipartisan commission recommended the closure, partial-closure, or realignment of 145 military bases.  Such a commission was recommended in the Grace Commission report.

Over the course of the next 13 years, with the implementation of four rounds of BRAC base closings, approximately 100, or 21 percent, of unnecessary domestic bases were closed, and the military ceased operations abroad at 960 foreign military bases.  These first four rounds of closings were reported by the Government Accountability Office to save taxpayers nearly $29 billion, and will save taxpayers $7 billion a year in the future.  In addition to the previous recommendations and closings, the 2005 BRAC approved 86 percent of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s initial recommendations to the commission. 

The Results Commissions’ recommendation approval process would be similar to the BRAC.  The Commission would collect information, deliberate, and then send their recommendations to the President, where the recommendations would receive approval or disapproval.  If approved, the recommendations would be sent to Congress for a vote.  In the event of disapproval, the Commission would have a period of time to revise their recommendations if they wish, and then submit them for expedited review by Congress.

There are some important similarities between these two commissions that highlight the need for the adoption of Sunset and Results Commissions. 

First, the leaders of these commissions were drawn from the private sector.  For the Grace Commission, they were private business leaders and executives; for BRAC, retired top admirals, generals, and military experts.  This was an important part of their success, as these commissions were able to rely on the commissioners’ knowledge and experience.  When the purpose is to derive specific recommendations on a subject, it is only logical to seek out those with the best experience and education.  That was a great advantage of these commissions, and if adopted, will be a characteristic of Sunset and Results Commissions as well.

Second, the members of these commissions were able to make appropriate and necessary recommendations without the fear of losing their next election or offending party leadership.  This independence is essential for honest and valuable criticism of suspect programs. 

However, Sunset and Results Commissions would not have unilateral power to cancel or modify questioned programs alone; like the Grace Commission and BRAC, such a commission would have its recommendations and proposals subject to review by Congress before they could be adopted.  Even the members of the commission would have to be approved by Congress before they could begin their work. 

Finally, the BRAC and Grace Commissions were given a specific task within their means to make recommendations.  Sunset and Results Commissions should also focus simply on their mission.  They would make their recommendations, revise them if needed, and then move on to their next subject when their task is complete.
 
The sources these commissions would most likely use to analyze and critique questionable programs are also a strength of these proposals.  As mentioned earlier, OMB’s PART is an excellent tool to help determine which programs are working.  PART focuses not only on the total amount of spending a program receives, but also the quality of those dollars spent compared with the results it achieves.  According to OMB, of the 60 percent of government programs so far assessed with the PART criteria, more than 30 percent are ineffective.  PART would offer Sunset and Results Commissions a straightforward and efficient tool to give meaningful and significant recommendations.  There are also numerous private sector analyses of programs that could be used by the commissions.

It is not the purpose of Sunset and Results Commissions to be used as a partisan tool to kill controversial programs.  Their purpose is to simply analyze the effectiveness of the program based on its known costs and apparent benefits.  Any attempt to make recommendations based on other criteria would be obvious and easily dismissed by Congress.

In closing, considering the costs to rebuild the Gulf States, it is imperative that as much be done as possible to reorganize the government and place programs under an regular review process.  Offsets need to be found if we are to avoid financial disaster.  As evidenced by previous commissions, an independent group of educated and passionate citizens can offer viable solutions to problems.  Sunset and Results Commissions, if adopted, would follow the legacy of previously successful commissions, and do a great deal to snuff out wasteful and unnecessary spending.