Frequently Asked Questions
Why is CAGW opposed to an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)?
CAGW first exposed the alternate engine as a pork-barrel earmark in the 2004 Congressional Pig Book. The organization opposes all earmarks on a procedural basis, and many also qualify as wasteful spending on the merits, including the JSF alternative engine. The Pentagon and Presidents Bush and Obama have been trying to eliminate funding for the alternate engine since 2006. There have been no conclusive studies to say that an alternate engine will either save the Pentagon money or enhance the capabilities of the JSF. Despite this opposition, Congress has appropriated $770 million in earmarks from fiscal years 2004-2009, including three anonymous earmarks totaling $465 million in the fiscal year 2009 Defense Appropriations Act. The House of Representatives and the Senate have earmarked $603 million and $439 million, respectively, in the fiscal year 2010 Defense Authorization Act in defiance of President Obama’s threatened veto of such funding.
Doesn’t CAGW support competition?
Of course CAGW favors competition; the organization has been fighting waste and pork in the defense bill since it helped expose the $436 hammer and $640 toilet seat in the mid-1980s. But study after study has shown that funding an alternate engine won’t lower costs or improve military readiness in any way. The only ones who benefit are the alternate engine’s manufacturer and its friends in Congress, including Senators Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who inserted the $439 million earmark into the Senate version of the fiscal 2010 Defense Authorization Act.
The process for the alternate engine is not the same as a free market. In this case, the government is footing the bill for the duplicative development and design costs as well as production and maintenance.
Furthermore, proponents seem to forget that there was a competition to see who would provide the engine that concluded in 2001, and the Pratt & Whitney engine won. There is no alternate airframe, no alternate landing gear, and no alternate cockpit.
Proponents claim that an alternate engine will lower costs.
Studies mandated by Congress have shown savings from competition are unlikely. Even the Senate Armed Services Committee, which has traditionally been a supporter of the alternate engine, said the studies were “inconclusive” on whether there would be a financial benefit.
An alternate engine means that taxpayers will foot the bill for two design teams, two production lines, two sets of spare parts and so on, minimizing the likelihood of ever saving money through competition.
Proponents have said that there are non-financial benefits as well, including increased operational readiness.
General Mark Shackelford testified on June 9 before the Senate Air Land Subcommittee that funding the alternate engine would actually undermine readiness. He said the cost of the alternate engine would mean building 53 fewer planes. That is not an improvement in readiness.
Proponents have said that there are non-financial benefits as well, including increased safety and reliability.
In fact, the opposite is true. Two engines add complexity to the maintenance of the engine---which also doubles costs. The engines are required by the Pentagon to perform identically, so any safety improvements must be developed and paid for twice, which could be a disincentive to innovation.
The possibility of a fleet wide grounding is remote. Because of advances in technology, such instances are nearly unheard of in these times.
Proponents have said that there are non-financial benefits as well, including a stronger industrial base.
GE is the largest supplier of military and commercial engines in the world. At a hearing before the Armed Services Committee in 2006, GE Aviation’s CEO said “I don’t think anybody’s ever said that GE’s going to shut up shop and go home if they’re not part of this contract.”
Where do you get the number of at least $7.2 billion that is referenced in your advertising?
That figure comes from a March 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, that showed costs savings of $7.2 billion by eliminating the alternate engine. This is a conservative number, as the Institute for Defense Analysis testified before Congress in March 2007 that the cost would be $8.8 billion.
GAO also says that savings are possible by having a competing engine.
The GAO makes a qualified statement about savings, which “will depend on the final approach for the competition, the number of aircraft actually purchased, and ratio of engines awarded to each contractor.” Eliminating the alternate engine can save billions now or taxpayers can hope the Pentagon is able to find the savings in the future. Given the track record of this program, it is better to save the money now.
GE has said they’ve already spent more than $2 billion on the alternate engine and it doesn’t make sense to kill the engine now. How do you answer that?
It’s unfortunate that much has already been spent, but that does not mean taxpayers should be forced to throw good money after bad. The Pentagon and two Presidents didn’t ask for this money; it was added by members of Congress as earmarks. GAO thinks another $5 billion and 6 years would be needed to complete development. There is no reason to keep spending taxpayer dollars on something that won’t save taxpayers money or improve military readiness, especially if it means taking 53 additional planes out of the program. That will also increase the per-unit cost, something else that taxpayers don’t need.